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Regulated Industries' Automatic Cost of Service
Adjustment Clauses: Do They Increase or Decrease
Cost to the Consumer?
Elizabeth Warren*
I. Introduction
Inflation in the past decade has affected both the overall financial condi-
tion of public utilities and the rates they charge. Utility bills have risen
sharply,' stimulating public interest in ratemaking. Both the utilities, who
want increased earnings, and the consuming public, who want low utility bills,
have exerted substantial pressure on regulatory commissions2 and on
legislatures. Utility commissions have proposed numerous regulatory
changes.3 In attempting to provide quick, visible solutions, the commissions
and the courts have accepted a patchwork of pricing techniques without con-
sistently considering their impact on total customer costs.
Among the hundreds of regulatory changes proposed, the automatic cost
of service adjustment clause has been the primary one used to offset the impact
of inflation on production costs. Individual proposals differ markedly, 4 but in
general the clauses propose to pass through to the customer the utility's costs as
they are incurred. The amount a customer pays for the utility service would
vary directly with the amount the utility expended to produce the service.
The automatic cost adjustment clause has been debated in popular5 and
professional6 literature as well as in the courts, commissions, and legislatures.
Much of the debate has been characterized by the unquestioned acceptance of
rubrics of what would cost or save consumers money. A number of varying cost
pass-through clauses were rapidly accepted during the utilities' collective finan-
cial crisis of 1974. 7 More recently, however, many courts have begun to
reevaluate the cost adjustment clauses and to review their initial acceptance of
them. 8 Regulatory commissions are beginning to exhibit ambivalence regard-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Bates College of Law, University of Houston. The University of
Houston generously supported research for this article with a Research Initiation Grant.
1 In 1977 the average annual electric bill rose by almost 14%, and in 1978 it rose 8.8% to just over
$3.57 annually. 1979 Statistical Report, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Mar. 15, 1979, at 51, 75. See also tables on
1976-78 increase in utility rates in Electric Rates Keep Climbing, Bus. WEEK, May 22, 1978, at 183.
2 See note 87 infra.
3 Among the new proposals or the suddenly revitalized proposals of earlier decades are interim rate
relief, expedited rate-case procedures, future test periods, pro forma adjustments, end-of-period rate bases,
attrition allowances, tax pass-on provisions, annual rate adjustments, and monthly fuel adjustments.
Latimer, The Cost and Efficiency Revenue Adjustment Clause, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 15, 1974, at 19, 20.
4 E.g., Sarikas, What Is New in FuelAdjustment Clauses, PuB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at 32, 35.
5 E.g., The FuelAdjustment Caper, 39 CONSUMER REPORTS 836, 839 (Nov. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Fuel
Adjustment Caper].
6 For a thorough discussion of the positions taken by various identified consumer and utility groups,
see Carver, Developments in Regulations: Adjustment Clauses, 53 DENVER L.J. 663, 665-68 (1976).
7 See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
8 Typical of courts' position is that taken in Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978). Here the court recognized that cost adjustment clauses
had been used in Wisconsin since 1918, but that the "typical" adjustment clause is the "more limited" fuel
adjustment clause. Id. at 714. The court ruled that "expanded adjustment clauses" violate statutory re-
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ing cost adjustment. Some are permitting and some are rejecting the clauses,
usually without discussion or with only superficial discussion of the effects the
action will have on total consumer costs and utility service. 9
There is an inherent rigidity in utility pricing without an automatic cost
adjustment provision. The price remains constant for the months or years be-
tween rate hearings regardless of dramatic upward or downward changes in the
cost of production. In nonregulated industries prices can be changed almost
immediately to reflect changes in the cost of production. There is a sharp dif-
ference in the responsiveness of price to changes in production costs between a
utility without cost adjustment clauses and a nonregulated industry. This dif-
ference reflects an inflation/regulation risk peculiar to regulated industries.
This increased risk causes utilities to have high capital costs that ultimately in-
crease total consumer costs.
To provide service, utilities must obtain capital for facility replacement
and for capacity growth. If utilities are to continue to operate as regulated in-
dustries rather than as tax-subsidized government agencies, they must attract
this capital on the private capital market. The comparative rigidity of utility
pricing affects investment risk which raises the cost of capital to the utility.
Public commissions tend to focus attention solely on the costs associated with
service production, such as fuel, labor and billing costs. Capital costs,
however, comprise as much as thirty percent of a utility's total operating
budget." It is time for commissions to consider total consumer cost, both pro-
duction costs and capital costs, when evaluating regulatory pricing schemes.
Most regulatory commissions have accepted the conventional wisdom that
a fixed price between rate hearings provides an incentive for the utility to
become more efficient. The support for that argument rests on unexplored,
fallacious principles. Moreover, in accepting or rejecting automatic cost adjust-
ment clauses, most commissions and writers ignore several other consequences
that result from price rigidity, including production distortions, rate hearing
cost increases, inefficient allocation of scarce resources and absence of cost sav-
ings pass-through.
It is the premise of this article that the purpose of a rate hearing is to deter-
mine rates that will provide continued, dependable service at the lowest possi-
ble cost to the utility customer. 1 Utility commissions must be cognizant of all
quirements to publicize utility rates because the adjusted rates vary from month to month. Id. at 715-16.
That the court wished to permit some cost flow-through but to curb any expansion becomes clear when the
court points out that only the "additional elements" contained in an automatic cost adjustment clause cause
it to violate the statute. Id. at 716. Presumably the fuel adjustment clause will retain its judicial acceptance
despite the similar variation in rates that it causes.
9 E.g., a trial court in Texas ruled on an injunction that would have permitted a temporary rate in-
crease before the city had the opportunity to present any evidence or to cross-examine one of the company's
witnesses. City of Houston v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 530 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). The
appellate court ruled that this failure to consider evidence from both parties was reversible error. Id. This is
obviously an extreme case ofjudicial disregard for the need to consider all the implications of a rate change,
but the overturned ruling reflects the willingness of some courts to rule on temporary or permanent utility
rates without considering all the ramifications.
10 A. PRIEsT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 47 (1969).
The reinforcing effect of increased capital cost in a capital intensive industry is a very high total expen-
diture for capital. See Rakes, Trends Affecting Power Company Securities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 31, 1978, at
26, 27, Table 1.
11 Some commentators challenge the assumption that lowest cost utility rates are necessarily in the
public interest because of the need for resource conservation. It is the thesis of this article that utility services
[February 19801
AUTOMATIC COST ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES
the effects of utility price rigidity. Ratemaking techniques which are being
reevaluated or proposed for the first time must be examined in light of how they
affect the utility's relative risk position in the capital market and the resulting
capital costs. Moreover, the concept of deliberately promoted regulatory lag as
an efficiency incentive should be reexamined. The often unanticipated effects
of regulatory lag are examined in this article so that the total cost to the
customer of utility pricing techniques becomes susceptible to analysis. This ar-
ticle is concerned with developing a long-needed theoretical framework for
evaluating cost adjustment clauses and the effect such clauses may have on
achieving the lowest possible utility costs.
II. Background
Automatic cost adjustment clauses have been used in some form since the
First World War when rapid inflation first made them necessary.1 2 The
number of clauses in use increased gradually through the early 1970's 1 3 when a
combination of unexpectedly high inflation and rapid deterioration in many
utilities' financial integrity forced the sudden adoption of nearly twice as many
clauses as had previously been in effect.1 4 Although courts and commissions
have approved cost pass-through for a variety of different costs, most cost ad-
justment clauses adopted in recent years have been limited to passing through
increases in fuel costs only. Use of the clauses has recently declined somewhat,
as commissions permit them to expire or abolish them outright.' 5
The proposals that are discussed as cost adjustment plans are remarkably
varied.1 6 By way of brief comparison: New Jersey has a plan for the telephone
company that permits four major categories of expenses-labor, depreciation,
taxes, and other-to be reflected in various percentages in periodic rate ad-
justments between rate hearings.1 7 New Mexico has authorized quarterly rate
adjustments if rising expenses cause the company's rate of return to deviate
from a specified range between rate hearings.' 8 In Michigan, the Public Ser-
vice Commission has proposed to base electricity rate adjustments on increases
in the national consumer price index.19 It is beyond the scope of this article to
compare and to evaluate particular rate adjustment plans. Instead, this article
should be produced at the lowest cost even if the government ultimately decides to encourage conservation
by taxing utility services and thereby depressing consumption.
12 Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PuB. UTIL. FORT., June 19,
1975, at 23, 24; Trigg, Escalator Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 964 (1958).
13 Carver, supra note 6, at 669-73, summarizes the legal history of the automatic cost adjustment clause.
14 Fuel adjustment clauses, which are limited cost adjustment clauses, were used for residential billing
for 35% of industries in 1970. By 1974 this'figure had risen to 72%. Sarikas, supra note 4, at 33.
Hyman & Grigoli, The Credit Standing of Electric Utilities, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 3, 1977, at 24, 26,
notes that many currently used adjustment clauses relate only to fuel adjustment and often are not fully
compensatory even for fuel costs. It is for this reason that although the use of some limited types of adjust-
ment clauses are growing, the public utilities have continued to suffer financial decline and have not enjoyed
the benefits of full cost adjustment clauses discussed infra.
15 E.g., Hildreth, Utility Financing Trends in 1979: A Preview, Pun. UTIL, FORT., Jan. 4, 1979, at 30.
16 See, e.g., Sarikas, supra note 4, at 32-36, for a discussion of several radically different plans that are all
discussed generally as cost adjustment clauses.
17 For a more complete discussion of this plan, see Backman & Kirsten, Comprehensive Adjustment Clause
for Telephone Companies, Pun. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 28, 1974, at 21.
18 In re Public Service Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
19 This plan was reported in Progress of Regulation, Trends and Topics: Automatic Rate Adjustment Clauses,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 14, 1978, at 51, 53.
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develops the theoretical basis for cost adjustment clauses generally and
evaluates the inherent benefits and liabilities of cost adjustment clauses rather
than the benefits or liabilities as they may exist because of the peculiarities of a
specific case. 20
Traditional regulatory procedures provide that a rate hearing be held for
each utility every few years. 2 1 That hearing settles what shall be the reimburs-
able costs, 22 the rate base or investors' equity, and the allowed rate of return.
Based on these cost determinations and on anticipated demand, the commis-
sion sets a price for the utility service. 23 That price is held constant until the
next rate hearing.
By contrast, use of the automatic cost adjustment clause permits rates to
be reestablished monthly, 24 if necessary. A change in an operating expense that
increases utility costs is reflected in the subsequent utility bill as a cost adjust-
ment passing through the utility's increased cost directly to the customer.2 5
The utility neither profits nor loses money from the increased cost.
Responsiveness of price to cost is what distinguishes automatic cost adjust-
ment clauses from escalator clauses, which are usually predetermined in-
crements in utility rates that are automatically triggered after a certain time has
elapsed since the preceding rate hearing. It is important to note that an
automatic cost adjustment clause may reduce rates as well as increase them.
Whenever utility costs decline or increase they are reflected in an automatic ad-
justment in the customer's bill. 26 Escalator clauses do not have the price
responsiveness effects of automatic cost adjustment clauses and, therefore, do
not enjoy the benefits discussed herein.
The costs referred to in the automatic cost adjustment clause are operating
costs. They may include fuel costs, labor costs, maintenance supply costs, and
whatever else the commission determines are "allowable costs" appropriate
for cost flow-through.2 7 Changes in capital costs as discussed in this article are
20 Automatic cost adjustment clauses in the nuclear energy field, for example, must develop with par-
ticular consideration of the technology of that field. For a full discussion of considerations relevant specifical-
ly to this field, see Smith & Lancaster, Nuclear Power's Effects on Electric Rate Making, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb.
2, 1978, at 16.
21 Five years is a fairly common time period between hearings. See, e.g., A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at
67-69. Because of the effects of regulatory lag, discussed infra, some critics have recently suggested shorten-
ing the period to three years. Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate Regulation: Plausible Policies for an Imperfect
World, in PRICES: ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 115 n.7 (A. Phillips & 0. Williamson,
eds. 1967). The time period between rate hearings now, in many instances, has disappeared. See notes
139-42 infra and accompanying text.
22 There has been much analysis of what should and what should not be a reimbursable expense. E.g.,
A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 45-138. See also note 27 infra and accompanying text.
23 The rate structure, that is, what prices should be charged different classes of customers, such as
private and industrial differentials, may or may not be decided by the commission. Frequently only per-
missible overall revenue restraints are decided. E.g., J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES
287-90 (1961).
24 It is not essential that an automatic cost adjustment plan make monthly adjustments, but a major
focus of this article is on the price responsiveness of utilities using such clauses compared to the relative price
inelasticity of utilities that have long periods between price adjustments. To the extent adjustments are more
infrequent than monthly, an increasing amount of regulat6ry lag, discussed infra, is introduced, and utility
price responsiveness is correspondingly reduced.
25 It is irrelevant whether the cost is passed through in a separate billing adjustment reflecting the base
cost and the cost adjustment separately on the customer's bill or in a single rate that is adjusted monthly.
26 See notes 155-58 infra and accompanying text.
27 Although cost flow-through may introduce incentive for additional scrutiny to the cost review pro-
cess, much of the conceptual framework for reviewing costs has already been developed by A. PRIEST, supra
note 10, at 45-138.
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the anticipated result of the adoption of these automatic cost adjustment
clauses and are, therefore, not included in the adjustment clause.
In addition to discussing the assumptions that are made with regard to the
cost adjustment clauses, it is important to note the peculiarities about regulated
industries which result in a particularly significant interplay between adjust-
ment clauses and capital costs. Utilities are by far the most capital intensive
corporations in the nation.28 Utilities must seek a high percentage of their
financing through competitive capital markets, 29 and financial analysts an-
ticipate continued, strong competition for capital. 30 Utilities cannot act solely
in their shareholders' interests as private corporations theoretically may. 3' As
public companies, they are obligated to provide sufficient production capacity
for anticipated public needs.3 2 Even if capital is expensive for them or if the ef-
fect of purchasing expensive capital is not in the best interests of present
shareholders, 33 utilities must go to the capital market to provide this production
capacity. Thus, the cost a utility pays for capital is a significantly greater por-
tion of the utility's operating budget than it is for most private corporations.
3 4
For a utility to continue to operate as a regulated industry rather than as a tax-
subsidized government agency, it must be able to attract capital in a com-
petitive capital market.
III. Corresponding Risks
The responsibility of a regulatory commission is to establish rates that
balance consumer and investor interests.3 5 The key reason that the interests
must be balanced is that the entire premise of regulation is violated if either in-
terest is shortchanged. If consumers are ignored, the utility will collect
monopoly profits, thereby belying of the assumption that the government
licenses utilities for "the public good." If the investors are ignored, the in-
dustry will fail to attract future capital and will either cease to operate or will be
able to operate only with tax-collected dollars and function essentially as a
government agency.
28 E.g., Cavanaugh, Utility Financing Needs: Prospects Are Cloudy, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Mar. 1, 1978, at
37.
29 A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 452. Approximately 60% of the funds generated in the next five years will
come from the competitive capital market rather than from the utilities' internal generation of investment
capital. Cavanaugh, supra note 28, at 39; Hildreth, supra note 15, at 30.
30 EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE FUTURE 305 (1976).
31 Zieha, Inflation, Dilution, and Electric Companies' Common Equities, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 26, 1978, at
23, 26-27.
32 Levy, Fair Return on Equity for Public Utilities, 13 Bus. ECON., Sept. 1978, at 46, 55, summarizes the
point:
Regulation requires utilities to provide quality service and to expand when warranted by con-
sumer demand. Unregulated companies would generally refrain from issuing new securities if
market conditions indicated that the equity of existing shareholders would be impaired.
Regulated companies do not have the same leeway. They must obtain capital when needed to
construct the capacity necessary to meet growing demands.
The data collected in the electric industry illustrates the squeeze on public utilities. As pretax interesi
coverage has dropped, capitalization has nonetheless increased, which has caused the total cost of debt to
rise 40% in a five-year period. The utilities are forced to expand to meet customer demand even if the
capital costs rise astronomically. Hyman & Grigoli, supra note 14, at 24, 27, Table 3.
33 See note 32 supra.
34 See notes 10 & 72 supra and accompanying text; see generally Hyman & Grigoli, supra note 14, at 24.
35 E.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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Protecting the financial integrity of the public utility is in the interests of
both the utility customer and the utility investor.3 6 The courts have noted that
utilities must pay "just and reasonable" rates of return on capital investments
to preserve their financial integrity and to assure continued service.3 Much at-
tention has been focused on determining precisely what is the just and
reasonable rate of return that will best insure financial integrity while at the
same time protecting the customer's interest by assuring continued, efficient
service at the lowest cost.38 In Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public
Service Commission, the United States Supreme Court noted:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the
value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal
to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of
the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended
by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to
profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or
speculative venturesA9
Although the Bluefield case is most often cited in the persistent controversy over
rate base valuation, 40 the key feature of the passage is the businesslike attitude
it displays toward the function of rates. Rates must be set so that in a com-
petitive capital market the utility will pay enough to attract capital sufficient for
continued, efficient operations, but it need pay no more than similarly risk
prone private companies. This is capital attraction theory at its most basic. Mr.
Justice Douglas, in the landmark decision of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 41
reiterated the guide to determining utility rates: "The return to the equity
owner should be commensurate with the returns on investments in other enter-
prises having corresponding risks. 42
Regulated industries compete in the same capital market with unregulated
industries. Thus they must pay at least the market rate for the capital they ac-
quire.4 3 It is axiomatic that investors demand compensation commensurate
with the risk associated with the investment. 44 The time value of money and the
degree of risk that accompanies an investment will determine the cost of capital
for that investment. 45 Because the time value of money will be the same for any
regulated or nonregulated industry seeking money, it is the comparison of risk
that will determine the competitive cost of capital to a particular company.
This competitive risk cost is the focus of this article.
36 E.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 50.
37 320 U.S. at 603.
38 E.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 147-283; A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 191-226.
39 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923).
40 E.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 258.
41 320 U.S. 591 (1944). Douglas in Hope took a very different position from Butler in Bluefield on rate-
base valuation on which the rates of return are computed, but both cases emphasize the corresponding risk
notion of the level of rate of return. For a more complete discussion of the divergence between Hope and
Bluefield on issues that are not discussed herein, seeJ. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 258.
42 320 U.S. at 603.
43 See note 104 infra.
44 E.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 623 (10th ed. 1976); J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF
MANAGERIAL FINANCE 283 (3d ed. 1974).
45 P. SAMUELSON, supra note 44, at 623-24. That a fair rate of return must compensate for the time value
of money plus an allowance for the degree of risk in owning the stock was recognized as early as 1908 in
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 48-49 (1908).
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The Bluefield-Hope criteria establish that a utility's rate of return should
reflect the least expensive capital cost-it must be high enough to compensate
for the associated risk, but it should be no higher. Utilities should pay the
minimum amount possible for capital to protect the customer's interest. But so
long as they are to be financed privately and not with tax subsidies, utilities
have no choice but to pay enough to compete successfully for capital. The
nominal test employed by a commission or a court often does not specifically
mention the corresponding risk criterion. 46 The most frequently used tests,
however, focus on what rate of return will assure financial integrity sufficient
for the utility to continue to attract capital.4 7
The notion that the return on equity to a regulated industry can be
measured by comparison with a similarly situated nonregulated industry has
achieved widespread acceptance.4 8 The comparison appeared to be valid
through the mid-1960's largely because regulated industries were able to com-
pete effectively with low risk-and hence low capital cost-nonregulated in-
dustries for capital.4 9 The similar payment for capital suggests that during this
time the nonregulated and the regulated industries had "corresponding
risk." 50
46 Christy & Christy, Does the Capital Attraction Argument Suffice?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 29, 1979, at 24,
takes the position that the nominal argument presented to commissions in rate hearings has been too
limited. The authors argue that several facets of capital attraction, notably the corresponding risk argu-
ment, should receive equal attention from those testifying to a just and reasonable rate of return.
47 Christy and Christy list the following as the four tests used by regulatory commissions to determine
rate of return: "[T]he return should suffice (1) to maintain the utility's financial integrity, (2) to provide a
return commensurate with that earned by other enterprises of corresponding risk, (3) to compensate the
company's investors for the risk assumed, and (4) to attract capital to the utility."Id. (footnotes omitted).
These four tests are all different facets of the underlying economic premise that the cost of capital will be its
time value plus an allowance for risk. Each emphasizes a different aspect, but the underlying notion of pay-
ing for comparable risks is central to each.
48 See, e.g., id.; Levy, supra note 32; West, Quantifying Intuitive Decisions on Rate of Return, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Jan. 18, 1979, at 23.
J. BONBRIOHT, supra note 23, at 258, describes the "comparable risk" theory as an ancillary measure in
determining a fair rate of return because of the impossibility of finding a group of unregulated industries
which are comparable in risk and earnings. This article does not attempt to suggest what a commission
should consider in determining what are comparable risks in a given instance. Instead, it is the intent of this
article to build on the comparable risks notion to demonstrate that utility commissions must be cognizant of
the utilities' competitive position in attracting private capital and to reconsider some ratemaking techniques
in light of how they affect the utility's relative risk position in the capital market and, hence, the utilities'
competitive price paid for capital.
Recent commentators note that even if it is true that no two firms face exactly the same risks, valid
comparisons can be made with nonregulated firms. See, e.g., Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings
Standard for Regulation of Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989, 998-1003 (1965).
49 Jones, Inflation and Regulation, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 4, 1977, at 17, 20, observed:
It is unquestionable that during a period of relative price stability (from 1955 to 1965) utility
stocks moved close in line with industrial stocks and strongly diverged from the trend movement
in bond yields. In the period of accelerated inflation (from 1966 to the present) utility stocks have
moved up systematically in line with bonds, a pattern strongly divergent from industrial stock
yields. Also the gap between industrial stock prices and utility stock prices was fairly constant in
the relatively non-inflationary period (1955 to 1965) but was widened substantially during the in-
flationary period of 1966 to date.
The author concludes that utility capital costs now have diverged from industrial capital costs and are now
significantly higher than industrials.
Christy, Utility Stocks and the Investor 1955-64, a Comparison with Industrials, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 6,
1966, at 38, suggests that utilities may have outperformed industrials before mid-1960. That trend was
sharply reversed then. E.g., Fredman & Sharma, The Performance of Electric and Natural Gas Utility Equities,
PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 12, 1978, at 22.
50 "Corresponding risk" is used in the sense of comparing total risk factors, not the similar structure of
the risk. As Levy, supra note 32, at 47, indicates, "it is the totality of risk which is important to investors and
total risk may be similar even when the business component is dissimilar." Levy notes that market perfor-
mance "reflects the investor's total return experience, and thus encompasses all of the risk factors to which
the investor is exposed." Id.
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The corresponding risk comparison appeared to be meaningful, but it was
too simplistic because it focused only on total risk. During the time period in
question, two risk-influencing factors had offsetting effects on regulated in-
dustries. Inflation over the ten-year period 1955-65 was nominal and relatively
predictable.5 1 A rate-setting commission could estimate with some accuracy
what inflation would be and how it would affect costs over a future time
period.5 2 During the same time, technological advances steadily made in-
cremental production cheaper for the public utilities.5 3 For example, economies
of scale available in production, transmission, and distribution of electricity
were generally sufficient to offset the effects of inflation. 54 The cost of produc-
tion, even with inflation affecting supply costs, remained nearly constant or
even dropped.5 5 Because of the roughly compensating effects of inflation and
technological advances, regulated and nonregulated industries were treated in
the market as having essentially similar total risks.5 6 Hence, the cost of capital
was similar for both types of industries.
In the mid-1960's these conditions began to change. Constant, low-level
inflation gave way to erratic and much higher inflation. 57 Technological ad-
vances could no longer offset inflation.5 8 Utility earnings declined sharply.5 9
The total risk to regulated and nonregulated industries then became strikingly
dissimilar, 60 and the difference in the composition of the risk, which had always
been present, suddenly became apparent.
The different risk factors between regulated and nonregulated industries
centered on differences in the ability to change service price to respond to
changing economic conditions. The nonregulated industry, when faced with
high, unanticipated inflation, adjusted its prices to cover its changed costs or
reduced production of items with rising marginal costs. 61 In a private industry,
prices or output could be extremely responsive to changing cost or market con-
ditions. So long as the rising costs affected all the competitors in a non-
regulated industry similarly, the nonregulated industry could raise its price and
not affect its relative position in the market or its rate of return. 62 The regulated
industry was, however, in a very different position. 63 Regardless of how the en-
51 Gies, Comment, in RATE OF RETURN UNDER REGULATION: NEw DIRECTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 187,
188 (H. Trebing & R. Howard, eds. 1969).
52 Gies cites the uncertainty of inflation that persists now as the key factor in raising the capital costs to
reflect inflation risk. Id. at 188-89.
53 E.g., Latimer, The Cost and Efficiency Revenue Adjustment Clause, PuB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1974, at
19; Miller, Rate Structure Reform: A Review of the Current Debate, 12 J. ECON. IsSUES 609, 610 (1978).
54 EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 290.
55 E.g., id. at 2; Miller, supra note 53, at 610.
56 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
57 E.g., Harriss, Inflation: Its Significance for Public Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 3, 1977, at 17;
Zieha, supra note 31, at 23-24.
58 E.g., EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 2; Miller, supra note 53, at 610.
59 E.g., Fredman & Sharma, supra note 49, at 24-26.
60 E.g., Christy & Christy, supra note 46, at 29.
61 See M. GORDON, MSU PUBLIC UTILITIES STUDIES, THE COST OF CAPITAL TO A PUBLIC UTILITY 52-53
(1974), for a mathematical model of the difference in pricing considerations between a regulated and a non-
regulated industry when faced with rising costs from inflation.
62 This is not to assert that a nonregulated industry is unaffected by inflation or cost changes. Inflation
has far-reaching effects on all industries. The point here, however, is the different effect in pricing respon-
siveness alone that a regulated and a nonregulated industry will face. The many similar effects felt by non-
regulated and regulated industries resulting from inflation are not pertinent to risk comparison between in-
dustries.
63 "During inflation many businesses succeed, more or less, in keeping prices in line with conditions
generally. Regulated utilities are not permitted to do so." Harriss, supra note 57, at 21.
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tire industry had been affected by changing costs or how inescapable paying a
higher cost might be, the regulated industry whose rates had been based on
costs established when prices were lower could only apply for a rate increase,
go through a rate hearing, wait for a determination, litigate any appeals taken
by either side, and then perhaps get the rate increase necessary to cover the cost
increments that precipitated the filing. 64 Of course, sometimes the commission
denied the rate increase, 65 or the rate increase was smaller than the incremental
costs that prompted the application, 66 or by the time the increase was granted it
was insufficient to cover the increase in costs that had occurred after the
filing. 67 Even if rates were eiientually set at appropriate levels, the lag in rate
setting reduced interim earnings, internal capital availability and the attrac-
tiveness of the utilities in the capital market. 68
The Bluefield-Hope notion of corresponding risks focuses on the increasing
capital cost for increasing risk. 69 Investors in both regulated and nonregulated
industries face many similar risks, such as the risk that demand for a product
will decline or the risk that management will be inept. Now that utility in-
vestors perceive that they face an additional risk-an inflation/regulation risk
that future utility prices will not cover production costs and will erode the equi-
ty rate of return-the comparative cost of capital to the utility will continue to
rise sharply. 70 One observer notes that utilities are getting'capital for plant ad-
ditions and modernization, but that the cost of such capital has exceeded the
cost that would have been incurred without the inflation/regulation risk. 71 In
64 Morgan, Toward a Revised Strategy for Rate Making, U. ILL. L.F. 21, 26(1978), summarized the usual
success of the attempt to recover costs that were higher than anticipated between rate hearings as follows:
"To be sure, at the time ofthe next increase, the firm will be allowed to raise its rate prospectively, but firms
are almost never allowed to make up past cost overruns." See alsoJ. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 53 n.10.
65 E.g., Nevada Power Company has recently filed suit in state court charging that the regulatory com-
mission's denial of its rate application was "capricious, arbitrary and in violation of the law." Finance, ELEC-
TRICAL WORLD, April 1, 1979, at 9.
A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 79-80, notes that when expenses occur after the cutoff date for the test
period for determining rates, commissions and courts frequently refuse to adjust operating incomes to reflect
the increased expenses.
66 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 571 F.2d 834, 847 (5th Cir. 1978).
67 E.g., Houston Lighting and Power Co. (HL & P) filed an application for a rate increase in 1975. By
the time the requested increase was granted, it was insufficient to prevent a sizable revenue deficiency. Re-
ply of HL & P to General Counsel's Request for Information, Application of Community Public Service
Company for Rate Increase, No. 177 (filed Feb. 12, 1975).
68 The court in Lynchburg Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 33, 35-36 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1954), additional
opinion sub nom. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 108 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1954), aff'd sub nom.
Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955), summarized the effects of infla-
tion and the utility's need for a rate hearing before utility prices can be adjusted: "The inevitable delay be-
tween the happening of an event that entitles a party to legal reliefand the date when he gets relief makes it
impossible in some kinds of cases for law and equity to do complete justice." Even if rates are eventually set
at appropriate levels, the lag in rate setting will reduce interim earnings, internal capital availability and the
attractiveness of utilities in the capital market. Mitchell & Chaffetz, Toward Economy in Electric Power, in
PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. ENERGY POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF REGULATION 221, 229 (E. Mitchell ed. 1976).
69 See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., Fredman & Sharma, supra note 49, at 24-26. Robinson, Comment, in RATE OF RETURN
UNDER REGULATION: NEW DIRECTIONS AND PERSI'ECTIVES 57, 60-61 (H. Trebing & R. Howard, eds. 1969),
summarizes the point:
[T]he regulatory authorities often are tainted with deep feelings as to what the cost ofcapital ought
to be, and resist the notion that the real market cost ofcapital may exceed their idea of what ought
to prevail. The net effect of this is that investors quite reasonably fear that the regulatory system
will be laggard in adjusting service rates to cover the cost of capital, which leads to the paradox-
ical situation that by stingy allowance for cost of capital, the regulatory system can create
ultimately a higher cost of capital than would otherwise prevail.
71 Jones, supra note 49, at 20, does not identify the risk as inflation/regulation, but he does blame in-
creased capital costs on essentially the same factors as those that comprise the inflation/regulation risk.
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an attempt to quantify the higher cost of capital to a regulated industry, one
financial expert estimates that "a utility stock would need to earn about three
percentage points more per dollar of equity than its [nonregulated] industrial
counterpart." 7
2
Increased capital costs for a utility can be reflected in a variety of ways.
The most discernible is when the commission permits a higher rate of return on
the equity investment. A commission may tacitly recognize the infla-
tion/regulation risk and allow a higher rate of return to compensate for it.73 A
scattered sampling of recent increases in utility returns that permit equity rates
of return of 14.2-14.6% ,74 14.5-16% ,75 and 17.73% ,76 suggests that some com-
missions are sensitive to increased risk costs and are allowing for them with ad-
justments in the rate of return. 77 The commission can justify its position simply
by stating that capital costs are rising, and that to attract capital, a higher rate
of return will be allowed.78 This means that higher capital costs of regulated in-
dustries will reflect the higher corresponding risks of Bluefield-Hope.
Regulatory commissions may adjust other ratemaking variants, 79 such as
the rate base on which the return is computed, to allow for the inflation/regula-
tion risk. 80 This is an alternate way to provide an increased rate of return on
equity investment.81
A major difficulty inheres in adjusting the rate of return to reflect the infla-
tion/regulation risk. Each increment in rate of return or other adjustment is
based on an estimate of the general level of inflation and how inflation will af-
fect a particular utility. Different price level shifts for different utility pur-
chases, changes in the products used because of technological innovation, and
regional price variations are just a few of the factors that make it difficult to
ascertain how anticipated, but unknown, inflation will affect a particular com-
72 Christy & Christy, supra note 46, at 29. Christy and Christy have included additional regulatory risks
in their estimation and have not limited it simply to the inflation/regulation risk. Id. Harriss, supra note 57,
at 21, notes: "Suppliers of funds should be in a good position to bargain for coverage for expected inflation
(plus risk due to regulatory lag). How much-one or 2 or 6 per cent a year? I do not know."
73 Carver, supra note 6, at 681.
74 Seligson, Electric Utilities Need More Equity, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 16, 1978, at 16, 20.
75 Management Report, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1978, at 37-40.
76 571 F.2d at 844, 847.
77 Fredman & Sharma, supra note 49, at 27, notes that in response to the sharp increase in inflation
1973-74, commissions permitted "massive rate increases in 1974 and 1975 and the lesser increases in 1976
and 1977 [to restore] recovery in the return on common equity of electric utilities." Utilities announced 190
dividend increases in 1977. Cavanaugh, supra note 28, at 38. Utility dividends have reached record highs in
1978-79. Management Report, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Feb. 1, 1979, at 2.
78 E.g., 571 F.2d at 844, 847.
79 E.g., Jones, supra note 49, at 18, notes:
The latest information I have is at least 25 of our commissions have utilized either the year-end or
the projected year rate base in an attempt to compensate for the problem of inflation and to pro-
vide greater assurances that the utility in the period in which the rates will be in effect will have an
opportunity to earn the rate of return allowed. Also, many commissions, for like reasons, have in-
cluded in the original cost rate base, plant held for future use and plant acquisition adjustment.
See note 3 supra and accompanying text for listings of still other commission responses to attempt to compen-
sate for the risks associated with inflation.
80 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 266-76, agrees that the effects of inflation can be offset by using an
original cost rate base and adjusting the rate of return. Webb, The 1975 Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act:
Revolution or Reaffirmation?, 13 Hous. L. REv. 1, 21 (1975), argues that "[als a practical matter, this is im-
possible since the percentage return would have had to exceed four times the current cost of money on a
1940 equity investment simply to offset the effect of inflation since that time." Webb may be entirely correct
about the political feasibility of the necessary rate increases needed to offset all the effects of inflation, but the
point here is that commissions lately have at least come to recognize that inflation/regulation risk forces the
utility to pay more for its capital, and they are beginning to adjust equity returns accordingly.
81 E.g., West, supra note 48, at 26.
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pany. 82 Because the degree and effect of the inflation/regulation risk are dif-
ficult to estimate, 83 the cost of capital is high enough to compensate for the
uncertainty.8 4 With typical regulatory compensation devices, a utility pays for
two risks to attract capital: the inflation/regulation risk that future rate prices
will not compensate for changes in production cost, and the risk that estimates
of the effects of inflation on a particular company are unreliable. A conse-
quence of the inflation/regulation risk is that the additional risk that the infla-
tion estimate is erroneous must also be compensated for with increased capital
costs.
Claiming to protect consumer interests, some commissions refuse to per-
mit increases in the rate of return to reflect the inflation/regulation risk. 85 Such
commissions save the consumer nothing. They may declare a lower than com-
petitive rate of return, but they cannot alter the fact that the utility must still at-
tract capital on the open market in order to continue to provide efficient ser-
vice. 86 The market, not the commission, sets the demanded rate of return.87
When utility dividends decline below the return demanded for their risk, utility
stocks decline in price until a new purchaser receives a return on the stock com-
mensurate with the price he paid for it.88 In a regulated industry this causes a
decline in the market value of the stock relative to the book value. 89 When the
market value is lower than the book value, sale of additional stock severely
dilutes the present investors' percentage ownership of the company. This raises
serious questions about the legitimate expectations of the investors and about
whether their capital investment has been confiscated by the utility. 90
From the viewpoint of the utility customer, however, a more serious con-
82 Harriss, supra note 57, at 18. Harriss cautions against "oversimplification" in estimating the effect of
inflation on a regulated industry.
83 Gies, supra note 51, at 188-89.
84 See J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 220-21 (3d ed. 1974); J. WESTON & E.
BRIGHAM, supra note 44, at 284-91; Sharpe, Risk Adjusted Measures of Security and Portfolio Performance, in RISK
AND REGULATED FIRMS 5, 6 (R. Howard ed. 1973).
Delano and Howard point out that it is the uncertainty of regulatory treatment even more than con-.
sistently poor treatment that raises a utility's capital costs. They suggest that uncertainty is the key risk fac-
tor that will cause increased capital costs. Delano & Howard, Regulatory Risk and Public Utilities, in RISK AND
REGULATED FIRMS 94, 96-97 (R. Howard ed. 1973).
85 Some observers describe the noneconomic factors that control rate determinations:
The outlook was pretty grim fr the electric utility companies in 1973-74. Interest rates were
soaring. So were fuel costs. And state regulators weren't budging on rate increases. Things got so
bad that even the politicians began wringing their hands over the plight of the utilities. And when
that happened, the politically appointed utility regulators got the message: Ease up on rates. Sud-
denly massive rate increases were approved and, in one of the swiftest industry turnabouts ever,
the lights went back on for the utilities.
Industry Report, ffas the Glow Gone out of Utility Stocks?, 12 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, April, 1978, at 109.
86 Utilities with expanding service demands, such as telephone, electric or interstate gas transmission
companies, are acutely aware of the necessity to attract capital. Utilities facing static demand, such as gas
distributors or water transmission companies in built-up areas, are not so severely affected by an inability to
attract future capital.
87 As the New Mexico Public Service Commission put it: "The cost or rate of return a public utility
must pay or be able to pay in order to obtain common equity funds from the private capital markets is set for
the company by the market, not by this commission or the company." 8 P.U.R.4th at 126.
88 Burkhardt & Viren, Investor Criteria for Valuing Utility Common Stocks, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 20,
1978, at 27, 35.
89 Id. This is a persistent problem. In 1979, 60% of utility siock was selling below book value. Hildreth,
supra note 15, at 31.
Burkhardt and Viren, supra note 88, at 27-35, predict anticipated book values by examining, among
other factors, the firms' payout rates. The prediction is remarkably accurate. Id. at 31, Table 1.
90 E.g., J. BONERIGHT, supra note 23, at 158; Christy & Christy, supra note 46, at 28-29; Jones, supra
note 49, at 19-20.
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sequence is the effect this change in the ratio of market value to book value has
on future investors. Current capital costs will reflect the perceptions of new in-
vestors of the risk associated with potential future dilution. 91 Some financial
observers report that at some point there cannot be a decline in market price
sufficient to pay for that risk, and that future investors simply will not purchase
a regulated industry's stock that sells for fifty percent or less of its book value. 92
In short, as the utility attempts to attract capital with a lower than competitive
rate of return, the market value of its stock will decline. Future capital costs will
thus reflect not only the inflation/regulation risk, but also the risk of continued
equity dilution. 93 If this condition persists, the utility will be unable to attract
additional capital. 94 At that point the utility will either be tax supported or it
will no longer have the capital to continue efficient operation. Either way the
consumer pays. Higher taxes to support utilities will cost consumers money
and will finance utility service in a way that discourages resource
conservation. 95 Some observers suggest that to permit severe degradation in
service would be the greatest disservice a regulatory commission could do to a
customer. 96
A similar effect can be observed in capital financing through issuance of
new debt (bonds). Financial observers point out that the increasing "interest
rate that a utility pays for funds depends not only on general economic condi-
tions, but also on the financial soundness of the utility itself." 97 A regulatory
commission may decide not to raise rates to levels that would reflect increased
costs and the inflation/regulation risk. As inflation forces production costs up,
the costs will be met from the operating income. There will thus be less
operating income available to assure protection for the debt, 98 and the utility's
bonds will then receive a lower rating. 99 Lower rated bonds cost more to raise
capital. 100 The downgrading in utility bonds, and the corresponding increase in
91 Cudahy, The Role of the Regulator in Utility Financing, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 18, 1976, at 29, 30;
Glassman, Fair Return to Equity-Why and How?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., May 25, 1978, at 11, 12.
92 White, Financing Electric Utility Investment Requirements, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 18, 1979, a- 27, 29,
describes the effect of continued dilution:
In fact, unless there can be a sufficient increase in the return on common equity to compensate
for the dilution in book value resulting from marketing new issue stock below book, there will be a
permanent reduction in the earnings and dividend growth potential of all common stock. There is
a point (reached at 50 to 70 per cent of book value) where selling 5 to 10 per cent additional com-
mon stock each year actually leads to declining earnings per share, absent sufficiently offsetting
increases in new income. And there is of course a very real point-perhaps below 50 per cent of
book value-where additional common stock simply cannot be sold.
93 8 P.U.R.4TH AT 128-30; EDIsON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 295.
94 See note 93 supra.
95 To the extent that production costs are borne by taxpayers, each utility customer hs less incentive to
conserve. The costs are "externalized"; that is, the cost to an individual consumer of using an increment
amount of service is less than the cost of producing it. The cost of using more will be borne partly by other
consumers, so there is a sharply diminished incentive to conserve the resource. The principle of externalized
costs is discussed generally in A. ALCHAIN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COOR-
DINATION, AND CONTROL 14-15 (2d ed. 1977). Also see generally Hanke, Backward or Forward-Looking Utility
Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 17, 1978, at 41.
96 E.g., Jones, supra note 49, at 19. Robinson, supra note 70, at 31, indicates if capital costs are not met
with increased rates of return to reflect inflationary pressures, consumers will pay for the increased produc-
tion costs by suffering declining service.
97 Hyman & Grigoli, supra note 14, at 26.
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the cost of utility debt in the past few years, have been spectacular. 10' Some
utilities have already been "cut out of the market for new funds. ' 10 2 Bond-
rating experts, such as those from Standard and Poor's, are quite frank in ex-
plaining that one of the three major criteria they consider in rating a bond issue
is the regulatory treatment the utility has received and can anticipate from the
regulatory commission. 103
The point is a simple one: there is no way to obtain capital financing for a
utility at less than the market valuation of the corresponding risk.1 0 4 Regulated
industries not only face risks similar to those faced by other industrials; t0 5 they
also confront risk associated with nonresponsive pricing.10 6 Regulatory com-
missions traditionally respond either by paying the investor a premium for the
risk or by ignoring the increased risk and letting the capital market adjust the
stock and bond prices to reflect the risk. In either event, the utility customer
ultimately bears the increased capital costs associated with the inflation/regula-
tion risk or faces declining service because no capital will be available for
modernization and new construction. Moreover, the traditional regulatory
compensation devices of paying higher dividends and interest or of letting the
market adjust stock and bond prices cause a utility to pay for the additional
risks that the inflation estimate may be uncertain, that future dilution may oc-
cur or that, at some point, the utility may be unable to attract more capital.
There is an alternative approach that commissions may use: instead of
having the utility pay for the inflation/regulation risk, they may eliminate the
101 E.g., this comment from Cavanaugh, supra note 28, at 37, demonstrates the decline in bond ratings:
"However, as the effects of inflation were felt on capital goods, fuel, operating expenses, and financing
costs, most electric and gas utilities suffered reductions in their credit ratings, leaving only one triple-A rated
electric system in the country today (Texas Utilities) and many fewer double-As." Between 1970 and 1975,
Standard and Poor's rating service downgraded some 75 electric utility issues. Fredman & Sharma, supra
note 49, at 25. From 1975 through 1978 the percent of utilities with bond ratings of AA or better declined
from 65% to 45%. Id. The decline in the investment status of electric utility bonds, for example, is evident
in 1979. Seligman & Rose, The Decline in Ratings of Electric Public Utility Companies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May
10, 1979, at 39, 41.
102 Fredman & Sharma, supra note 49, at 25.
103 Fendrich, Utility Rating Criteria, Financial Outlook, and Observations on Regulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Jan. 4, 1979, at 32. Fendrich listed the three criteria as (1) business position of the utility, (2) regulatory
treatment, and (3) management. Fendrich, Vice President, Corporate Ratings, Standard & Poor's Cor-
poration, describes the situation in bond ratings:
Regulation, of course, has a responsibility to respond to a utility's situation because the public in-
terest demands it; and how regulation has responded in the past, how it sees its responsibilities to-
day, and how it is likely to respond in the future are directly related to the relative level of credit
quality.
Id.
104 Seligson, supra note 74, at 17, summarizes the point this way:
A regulatory commission which is concerned with the provision of utility service cannot compel
anyone to provide the required capital, but can institute a regulatory climate which will cause
those who control such investments to think favorably about making investments in that climate.
The problem of regulation is to achieve the correct balance both to assure that capital will be
made available and that it will be available at reasonable cost.
See also note 88 supra.
105 In fact, a utility's other risks may be lower than a private company's. If so, when the infla-
tion/regulation risk factor is eliminated, then capital costs to a utility will reflect lower costs. See, e.g., J.
BAUER, UPDATING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 107-14 (1966).
106 Christy and Christy, supra note 46, at 29, summarize the position of the utilities: "In the present in-
flationary setting, a comparison of specific types of risk tells us utilities must have far greater overall risk than
industrials" (emphasis in original). Christy and Christy list several inflation-related risk factors; key among
them are price regulation and regulatory lag. Id.
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risk 0 7 by adopting automatic cost adjustment clauses.10 8 By reflecting produc-
tion cost changes in utility rates on a dollar-for-dollar basis as they are in-
curred, automatic cost adjustment clauses end the risk that utility prices will
not reflect the full costs of production. Assuming temporarily that all other
costs are held constant,10 9 the adoption of an automatic cost adjustment clause
does not raise consumer costs over the long run. The customer pays the actual
cost incurred and pays relatively less for capital that no longer bears the risk
that regulatory pricing will not reflect full costs. Assuming that the market
responds with some accuracy to the risks of capital, °10 the customer is in the
same relative position whether he pays for production costs through cost of ser-
vice adjustment clauses or he pays through reduced service or the increased
capital costs that result from inflation/regulation risk. Either way the customer
eventually pays production costs.
Total customer costs may not, however, be the same when production cost
increases are borne through increased capital costs rather than cost pass-
through. The typical methods of compensating for inflation/regulation risk
create additional risks. Increased capital costs also compensate for these risks.
With cost adjustment the high risk that a commission may incorrectly estimate
the impact of inflation no longer exists because the cost adjustment clause
simply reimburses the utility for the actual costs it incurs. The risk that a com-
mission will not make up the cost increases in a timely fashion and will thus
cause the utility to lose the time value of the money is also eliminated.,
Because price increases will be covered in adjusted rates, earnings will not be
eroded and bond ratings should improve. 11 2 Because a lower rate of return will
be acceptable for a lower risk, market prices of stocks that pay lower rates of
return should not decline relative to their book value. This will reduce the risk
of dilution and help insure that utilities will be able to attract capital in the
future. When the New Mexico Public Service Commission adopted a type of
cost adjustment plan, it concluded that it could restore the financial integrity of
the utility by reimbursing operating costs that were higher than anticipated
because of inflation.
If, as pointed out earlier, the cost of capital was comparatively low to a public
utility when and because it enjoyed earnings stability and reliability, it follows
107 In the strictest sense of the word, the risk has not been eliminated, it has been shifted. The infla-
tion/regulation risk borne by investors has been replaced by a risk borne by consumers that production costs
will fall or rise. Myers, On Public Utility Regulation Under Uncertainty, in RIsK AND REGULATED FIRMS 32, 38
(R. Howard ed. 1973), argues that investors rather than consumers should bear risks. But Myers recognizes
that investors must be paid more for the risk they bear. Id. Although Myers's thesis that investors, whom he
dubs risk specialists, should bear risks is inapplicable when the allocation increases total customer costs, as
explained in notes 110-12 infra and accompanying tex;, or when other economic distortions result.
108 The term "automatic cost adjustment clause" as used here refers only to adjustments for charges in
otherwise reimbursable operating costs. Changes in capital costs are the anticipated result of the adoption of
such automatic cost adjustment clauses, and are not included in the adjustment.
109 The possibilities that other costs may rise or fall if automatic cost adjustment clauses are adopted is
discussed in subsequent paragraphs. Here the focus is simply on risk changes and the effect on capital costs.
110 J. VAN HORNE, supra note 84, at 220-21; Sharpe, supra note 84, at 6; seeJ. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM,
supra note 44, at 283-86.
111 There may be a lag of a month or two while accounting adjustments are made for the cost changes,
but compared to a one-year or five-year lag the effect is de minimis.
112 The correlation between the change in interest coverage (income available to meet expenses) and the
cost of debt is evident in Table 3, Hyman & Grigoli, supra note 14, at 27. See also note 113 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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that, if risk is again reduced by restoration of earnings stability and reliability,
the cost of capital should again be comparatively lower. 113
It is inescapable that the customer will pay the cost of producing the service,
either by paying the costs as they are incurred with automatic adjustment
clauses or by paying them in the future with increased capital costs, declining
service, or both. The automatic adjustment clauses do not increase total con-
sumer costs. By eliminating the additional risks associated with typical
regulatory compensation, such clauses may, in fact, reduce total customer
costs.
IV. The Regulatory Lag Fallacy
In traditional regulatory procedures, setting rates based on past costs and
letting time elapse between rate hearings produces what is known as regulatory
lag. Although adopting automatic cost adjustment clauses could provide sav-
ings in capital or other costs, some commentators argue that regulatory lag pro-
vides incentives for efficiency and should be preserved.1 14 The efficiency incen-
tive argument, briefly, is as follows: At a full hearing, the commission sets rates
based on current cost and technological estimates.115 Between that rate hearing
and the subsequent one, fixed rates will cause the utility to attempt to lower
costs so that it can capture higher profits. If costs increase in the interim, the
utility has an incentive to scrutinize costs more closely to prevent further in-
crease and erosion of the rate of return.
The notion that utilities will respond to regulatory lag as an incentive to
cut costs rests on three unspoken premises: that costs actually can be cut by in-
creased efficiency without degrading service standards, that inflation will cause
production costs to rise, and that the total possible cost cuts will approximate
increases in costs due to inflation over the lag period. Although there is little
empirical evidence to support the assertion, 1 6 it is undoubtedly true that often
in the cost estimates presented by a utility in a rate hearing there is room for
reduction. The assumption that the amount of reduction will equal the infla-
tion rate in the interim period is simply without justification. Production costs
have risen, but at erratic and unpredictable rates. "17 The inflation rate may
dramatically overstate or understate the costs that can be saved if the utility
were more efficient. There is no functional relationship between the amount
which costs may be driven up by inflation and the amount they may be reduced
by increased efficiency. A genuine efficiency incentive program must function
independently of the effects of inflation. An inefficient company should not
profit simply because inescapable costs decline, any more than an efficient
company should suffer simply because inescapable costs rise faster than the
company's high rate of efficiency."" Of course, given precisely the same
113 8 P.U.R.4th at 131.
114 E.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 53.
115 Traditionally a rate is based on historic costs. The effects of regulatory lag are somewhat ameliorated
when utilities decide instead to use future cost estimates to determine reimbursable costs.
116 See notes 132-34 infra and accompanying text.
117 See generall Hyman & Grigoli, supra note 14, at 25.
118 Latimer, supra note 53, at 21, argues that the effects of inflation and the results of increased produc-
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economic conditions, an efficient company is going to fare comparatively better
than an inefficient company. The difficulty is that success relative to other
utilities caught in the inflation squeeze is not what boosts returns. Each utility
is concerned with its own financial success. The major factor that will deter-
mine a utility's financial success will be the degree of inflation during the lag
period. As an efficiency incentive, regulatory lag functions poorly because
neither the rewards nor the punishments that flow from it bear a direct rela-
tionship to the company's efficiency.
Regulatory lag simply operates as a squeeze on the utility. The need for
the squeeze, the degree of squeeze, and when the squeeze should be applied are
not issues that commissions consider when they permit regulatory lag. In-
terestingly, as a utility becomes more efficient, it has more to fear from
regulatory lag. An inefficient utility has many cost reductions available to offset
inflation during the interim. It may choose to implement few or several. By
contrast, an efficient producer has few cost cuts yet to be made. High inflation
during a regulatory lag period may impair the efficient producer's financial in-
tegrity. Regulatory lag is at best an "inadvertent, "119 ''crude, 120 and "clum-
sy" 121 tool to promote utility efficiency.
Bauer argues that one of two situations will always be present: either
regulatory lag will cause a company to earn less than the returns that the rate
case had determined were fair, or it will earn monopoly profits in excess of the
rates deemed fair by the commission. 122 The first condition will ensue
whenever costs rise faster than a utility's innovation can keep pace, and the
second will occur whenever costs decline or whenever costs rise less than the
utility's innovation. In either event, Bauer argues, the utility's rate of return
will differ from what was determined to be the fair rate of return. 123 More to
the point, the utility's rate of return under either condition will be only partial-
ly affected by the utility's efficiency. Factors well outside the utility's control,
such as fuel or construction costs, are likely to have a far more profound effect
on its rate of return during the period of regulatory lag. Moreover, because
regulatory lag keeps utility revenues constant there is the risk that a utility's
unavoidable expenses may become so out of line with the revenue received that
the utility faces economic ruin. For example, in 1974, a failure to allow
automatic rate adjustment "might have wiped out the net income of several
large utilities, reduced their earned surplus, and in some cases might have ab-
sorbed the entire net cash flow from operations, so that even if no dividends
were paid, no-cash would have been available for interest payments." 24
Regulatory lag causes other difficulties that may ultimately increase
tivity should be clearly separated in an efficiency incentive plan. He discusses such a plan that combines cost
adjustment with efficiency incentive. Id. at 21-24.
There are incentive plans currently in use that tie a utility's rate of return to service efficiency. Com-
missions have developed service criteria to separate efficient from inefficient utilities and to reward the
utilities accordingly. In re The Narragansett Elec. Co., 23 P.U.R.4th 516 (R.I. P.U.C. 1978).
119 Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 30, 36
(P. MacAvoy ed. 1970).
120 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 54.
121 Morgan, supra note 64, at 26.
122 J. BAUER, supra note 105, at 117-18 (1966).
123 Id.
124 Morgan, supra note 64, at 45.
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customer costs. Hughes indicates that a utility may have the capacity to pro-
vide an improved service (in his example, underground transmission lines),
but "general customer resistance to rate changes that permit utilities to charge
undergrounding costs directly to the affected customers" will make the utility
reluctant to proceed. 125 Hughes says that utilities fear "increasing the rate base
at an uncpntrolled pace and getting squeezed by regulatory lag."1' 26 This il-
lustrates the disincentive to efficient performance that regulatory lag causes.
When a superior service can be offered for low cost, the utility, squeezed by
regulatory lag, can only focus on the increased cost and has a strong disincen-
tive to offer the new service. Service increases will be proposed only at rate
hearings. At a rate hearing a utility's primary concern is to argue for other rate
increments related to rising costs. The utility may demonstrate little interest in
pursuing the new service for fear that it will not be politically possible to get a
rate increase sufficient to cover both increased costs generally and increased
costs for the new service.1 27 It is the customer who does not get a new service
for which he would be willing to pay who ultimately suffers.
Another likely result of regulatory lag in ratemaking is distortion in the ef-
ficient functioning of a utility. A utility is as aware of the future it faces with
regulatory lag as is a commission. The following hypothetical may illustrate:
Knowing that a rate hearing is due, say, every five years, a utility in the fourth
year after a hearing discovers a technological innovation that will sharply
reduce utility costs. If the utility implements it in the fourth year, it will enjoy
one year of increased profits before the new rate hearing, and a new rate will be
imposed based on cost estimates which include the innovation. When
regulatory lag is the only efficiency incentive, the benefit to the utility from the
innovation disappears at the subsequent rate hearing. If, however, the utility
does not employ the innovation immediately, the rate hearing will establish
rates based on higher costs. The utility may then implement the innovation in
the first year after the new hearing. The utility will then receive the benefit of
an increased rate of return for five years, and the customer will have paid in-
creased costs for six. The heart of an efficiency plan is in permitting the com-
pany to retain some portion of the benefits of its own efficiency. If the utility is
unable to retain some of the benefit generated by efficiency innovations, it will
suffer from the so-called "paradox" of regulation that permits the least effi-
cient and the most efficient firms to receive the same return on equity. 128 The
difficulty with regulatory lag is that it provides an incentive to delay introduc-
tion of innovations until immediately after rate hearings. 1 29 Both the consumer
and the utility lose during those delays.
125 Hughes, Comment, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 73, 83 (H. Trebing ed. 1968).
126 Id.
127 Wein, Fair Rate of Return and Incentives, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 39, 61 (H. Trebing ed.
1968), notes that rates are not just determined by the cost of service, but that they are "judicial and
political" in nature. This suggests that a utility may only be able to receive a limited rate increase regardless
of the economic factors involved. See also notes 80, 87 supra.
128 Without having the utility retain some of the benefits generated by efficiency, the regulated in-
dustries suffer from the so-called "paradox" of regulation that permits the least efficient and the most effi-
cient firms to receive the same return on equity. I. BUssING, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION AND THE So-
CALLED SLIDING SCALE 11 (1936).
129 The effect is described as "bunching" the introduction of innovations immediately after rate hear-
ings.
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Massell describes a similar, more pervasive disincentive effect of
regulatory lag.130 He indicates that the process of rate regulation, anticipated
and feared by the utilities, induces "the enterprise to hold back the innovations
as a 'hidden reserve' to protect itself against future rate reductions or economic
depressions."13t Although Massell illustrated his principle with rate regulation
generally, the premise is that even unconsciously a utility may build in a "hid-
den reserve" of innovation to protect itself against future cost increases that it
will need to be able to offset. Recent economic adversity has probably depleted
any innovation reserve public utilities may have stored, but the potential for
encouraging them with regulatory lag schemes is always present.
Using regulatory lag as "an efficiency incentive may be based on another
faulty premise. It assumes, in part, that the utility could save costs simply by
shopping more or bargaining harder. 132 Both industry observers 133 and some
recent empirical data134 suggest that this simply is not true. With or without
cost pass-through clauses, utilities are bargaining to keep costs low. 135 Bon-
bright136 and Wein 137 suggest instead that any current inefficiency in regulated
industries stems not from incurring unnecessarily high costs, but rather from
failure to develop technological innovations that will reduce utility costs. Such
innovations can come only from research and development programs. When a
utility faces capital erosion because of unavoidably rising costs, one place
where cuts can be made while maintaining the service demanded by the com-
mission is in the research and development program. Any incentive program
needs to monitor research and development expenditures, of course, but the
way they are monitored through regulatory lag is by cutting them if other costs
have gotten too high and by not cutting them if other costs have been con-
trolled. There is nothing in regulatory lag that encourages making long-term,
efficiency decisions about research and development expenditures. If Bon-
bright and Wein are right that this is the area in which utilities are most ineffi-
cient, then regulatory lag exacerbates rather than corrects for this inefficiency.
Finally, the most costly effect of regulatory lag is that by masquerading as
an efficiency incentive, it deflects attention from true efficiency incentives
which are innovative, well considered, and well planned. 38 Several efficiency
incentive proposals have been developed in recent years. Each provides a
systematic review of what the increased incentive is supposed to achieve and
130 Massell, The Regulatory Process and Public Utiliy Performance, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 113,
118 (H. Trebing ed. 1968).
131 Id.
132 Opportunities for profiteering with automatic cost adjustment clauses, such as falsifying sales be-
tween subsidiaries and parent corporations, are already scrutinized by the commissions and by mandate of
federal law. A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 89-90.
133 EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 326-27, cites the Ohio study indicating that fuel adjust-
ment clauses tend to promote utility price efficiency.
134 The Federal Power Commission has attempted to audit utilities to determine whether automatic ad-
justment clauses currently in use have resulted in a decline in the utility's attempts to purchase at the least
possible cost. The Commission found no evidence that utility practices failed to protect consumer interests.
Fuel Clause Adjustment Impact Studied, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 19, 1978, at 25. There has been some suggestion
that the Commission's study may not have been adequate. Morgan, supra note 64, at 46.
135 SeeJ. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 262-63.
136 Id.
137 Wein, supra note 127, at 58.
138 Posner, supra note 119, at 37, is one of many critics who "doubt the importance" of regulatory lag as
an effective efficiency incentive.
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how it operates without creating other regulatory distortions. Commentators
have developed several suggestions for evaluating incentive programs.1 39 It is
beyond the scope of this article to endorse a specific incentive proposal, but the
automatic cost adjustment clause is championed here in the full recognition
that an "inadvertent" incentive scheme will disappear and that a commission
should, when considering readjusting rates to reflect automatic cost adjust-
ment, also search for a viable efficiency incentive program. Regulatory lag is,
at best, a profit-squeezing device unrelated to real efficiency potential.1 40 It
causes distortions in the introduction of incentives and real disincentive for
providing some types of efficiency. That regulatory lag continues to protect
consumer interests and is the best available means of providing efficiency in-
centive is demonstrably a fallacy.
V. The Automatic Cost of Service Adjustment Clause
A. Changes in the Rate Hearing
When automatic cost adjustment clauses are approved, the frequency,
and resulting cost, of rate hearings is likely to decline. In 1964, Priest described
rate hearings as "infrequent events." 41 By 1977, Jones described rate hear-
ings as "almost continuous" affairs.14 2 The frequency of hearings has in-
creased so dramatically that some observers accuse commissions of permitting
"pancaking," that is, granting temporary rate increases while the utility ap-
plies for successive rate increases, each built on the one immediately
preceding. 143
The frequency of rate hearings has been on the rise primarily because
utilities need to offset the effects of regulatory lag and to decrease the infla-
tion/regulation risk. 1 44 Under traditional regulatory procedures, a utility faced
139 E.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 262-65; Baumol, supra note 21, at 108-15.
140 Some commentators recognize the need for automatic cost adjustment clauses, but in an attempt to
keep the "best of both worlds," they recommend only partial cost pass-through to retain some of the effi-
ciency incentive. The Federal Power Commission disagrees with the notion that such a mixed plan is better:
It should be noted that to the extent that only a portion of charges in fuel costs are permitted to be
reflected in rates, the purpose of the fuel clause (namely to pass on to customers the increases or
decreases in the fuel costs actually incurred by the utility) is to that extent defeated. When fuel
costs are rising the utility is disadvantaged by not being able to collect the full amount of the in-
crease; when fuel costs are falling the customers are disadvantaged because the full amount of the
reductions are not passed along, but are partly retained by the utility. In addition, the lag in col-
lections for fuel expenses inherent in a typical fuel cost adjustment clause provides some incentive
for companies to bargain for favorable prices during periods of rising fuel costs.
39 Fed. Reg. 40,583 (1974). Ofcourse, to the extent that partial pass-through is used, utility pricing regains
the nonresponsive characteristics that cause higher capital costs, etc.
141 A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 61.
142 Jones, supra note 49, at 18.
In 1968, eight electric companies received rate increases, and 26 applications for increases were pend-
ing at the year's end. In 1978, 73 electric companies received rate increases, and 61 applications for in-
creases were pending at the year's end. 1979 Statistical Report, Everything Is up: Electric Revenues, Rates,
Dividends-and Prices, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Mar. 15, 1979, at 76.
143 Finance Utilities Accused of "Pancaking" Rates, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Apr. 1, 1979, at 9. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Chairman Charles Curtis considers pancaking serious enough to suggest that Con-
gress amend the Federal Power Act to impose a one-year limit on rate-case decisions or to change FERC's
regulatory process to narrow the scope of issues subject to litigation. Id. His suggestions may become law,
but they do not address the cause for the frequent rate hearings. Only eliminating the effects of regulatory
lag will reduce the need for frequent rate hearings.
144 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 49, at 17-18.
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with inescapable, rising costs can obtain relief only from a rate hearing. The
faster costs rise, the sooner a utility will apply for a rate reevaluation. Rate
hearings are enormously expensive,t 45 and utilities ultimately charge rate case
expenses to the consumer as reimbursable expenses.146 Carver asserts that
commissions have been "candid" in permitting higher rates of return than
otherwise might have been allowed simply to extend the time period between
rate cases.1 47 Obviously, either frequent rate hearings or higher than expected
rate increases to stave off hearings are expensive for the customer. By taking
utilities out of the rising costs/fixed price cast of traditional ratemaking,
automatic cost adjustment plans will eliminate the need for frequent rate hear-
ings. Thus, the cost the consumer will bear for frequent hearings is likely to
decline.
For a large utility, automatic cost adjustment may amount to a substantial
savings to the customer. For a small utility, it may make the difference in
whether the utility continues independent operation or merges with a larger
utility. 148 Many small utilities operate efficiently throughout the country;
however, as the need for frequent rate hearings drives administrative and legal
costs of utilities up, many utilities are caught in a squeeze. Rising costs make
the utility's continued operation impossible without resetting rates, but the cost
of a rate hearing may well be more than the utility will gain at the hearing. The
transaction costs associated with regulatory lag and the inflation/regulation risk
may cause many small utility companies to cease independent operation.
Rate hearings and appeals are lengthy affairs.1 49 Much hearing time is
now spent reviewing the financial difficulties that have faced utilities as a result
of the inflation/regulation risk. If automatic cost adjustment clauses were
adopted, utilities could focus on how costs and revenues should be
determined. t 0 Once a framework that would determine cost eligibility for
automatic adjustment has been established, costs themselves could be
monitored by bookkeepers and accountants. The commission could make spot
checks on the utility's implementation of cost pass-through, but the utility
would be free "to consider in detail management's long range construction,
production and financing programs." 5 As Morgan points out in his recom-
145 Sam Hunter, Director of Rates and Economic Research for Southwestern Public Service Company
in El Paso, estimates that a rate hearing usually costs a utility a quarter to a half million dollars. Letter from
Sam R. Hunter to Elizabeth Warren (Sept. 21, 1979) (on file in The Notre Dame Lawyer office). Uthus &
McIntire, Public Utility Rate Regulation and the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act-Extending Maximum Procedural
Protection to Public Utilities at Public Expense, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 491 (1976-77), estimates that just the cost
of a single appeal from a rate hearing in Iowa is $140,000.00.
146 A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 67-69; Uthus & McIntire, supra note 145, at 486-87, 491-92.
147 Carver, supra note 6, at 681.
148 Baron, The Challenge of Wall Streetfor Smaller Utilities, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 1, 1979, at 19, discusses
the financial difficulties of the small utility.
149 This was the conclusion of Thomas Morgan after he conducted a study for the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States on the current delays in regulatory procedures. Morgan, supra note 64, at 76.
Morgan indicates commission decision times of one to three years are average. Id. at 26. The Edison Electric
Institute illustrates a typical sequence for filing and implementing a rate. The regulatory lag in the illustra-
tion is two years. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 291.
150 Although Morgan suggests different, more-comprehensive administrative reforms in ratemaking
procedures, he concluded that the goal of reform should be to give the commissions more time to study how
costs and revenues should be determined. Morgan, supra note 64, at 76.
151 EDIsON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 43, indicates that this would be a chief benefit of any
plan to streamline utility ratemaking procedures.
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mendations for streamlining the regulatory hearing process, "[r]ulemaking is
costly and time-consuming but when used as a mechanism for focusing data on
relevant issues and simplifying the ultimate decision process through settle-
ment, its potential can be maximized.'"152 Moreover, as commissions are freed
from constant rate hearings centering on inflation-caused price changes, they
can concentrate on the efficiency incentives that are currently lacking in
regulatory schemes. Freeing the regulatory commission and the rate hearing
process to focus on the conceptual framework for regulatory control may
ultimately be the biggest boon of automatic cost adjustment clauses.
B. Efficient Use of Scarce Resources
Bonbright explains that a major function of utility service pricing is to set
the rate to promote efficient resource rationing.1 53 Utility prices that reflect
current, actual costs permit the consumer to decide whether his use of the prod-
uct is worth, to him, the full cost of producing it. t 54 William W. Lindsay, now
Associate Chief of Economics at the Federal Power Commission, summarized
the pricing considerations in the electric industry:
[T]he amount of electricity taken is affected by the price charged. Since the
amount of resources allocated to the production and distribution of electricity
depends on the demand for the service and the latter depends on the level and
structure of rates, resources will be misallocated to the extent that rates fail to
reflect costs. In this sense, among others, prices which do not reflect costs are
not in the public interest. 155
By reflecting increased production costs through future increases in capital
costs, traditional pricing mechanisms distort the resource allocation function of
prices. Service prices that are temporarily low may encourage inefficient use
when the cost of production is rising rapidly and the utility must wait until the
next rate hearing to have that increase reflected in the price. A recent report
prepared for the Ohio Electric Utility Institute indicates that "[e]ven tem-
porary underpricing could create an artificial stimulus toward greater energy
consumption and increase the capital investment requirement.' ' 56 Service
prices that are temporarily high may also discourage efficient use. When
capital costs reflect high inflation/regulation risk because of the utility's earlier
financial performance, an artificially high price will also temporarily distort
resource allocation. By passing increased costs through to the utility customer
152 Morgan, supra note 64, at 76.
153 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 23, at 49, lists four functions of price: (1) the capital attraction function, (2)
the efficiency-incentive function, (3) the income-distributive function, and (4) the consumer-rationing func-
tion.
154 Whether marginal cost pricing or average cost pricing is employed is not essential here; what is
essential is the general use of price to assure efficient allocation of resources.
155 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE &
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., IsT SEss., REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY AUTOMATIC FUEL ADJUSTMENT
CLAUSES (Comm. Print 1975).
156 EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 11, citing Public Utility Commission of Ohio and Ohio
State University Department of Mechanical Engineering, The Fuel Adjustment Clause, May 8, 1975, at 4,
prepared for the Ohio Electric Utility Institute and distributed to the Joint Select Committee on Energy.
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almost immediately, automatic cost adjustment clauses help insure that the
most efficient use is made of utilities' services.
C. Savings Pass-Through
In evaluating the automatic cost adjustment clause, one should not con-
sider that only cost increases will be passed through to the customer. The
automatic cost adjustment clause operates purely to adjust utility service rates
to reflect the actual current costs of production. If some production costs
decline, they, too, are passed through immediately.
One particular kind of cost savings that might be passed through regularly
to consumers is associated with tax accounting. In keeping with the re-
quirements of the Internal Revenue Code1 5 7 and treasury regulations, 15 there
are some cost savings that may be passed on to the consumer only after the sav-
ings have been incurred. Adjusting rates to reflect anticipated savings is not
permitted. 159 The customer's bill under typical cost adjustment procedures
with regulatory lag will not reflect the savings until the next rate hearing. With
an automatic cost adjustment plan in force, however, the utility could be re-
quired to reflect the savings as it is created monthly. 160
Of course, the kinds of savings that can be passed on to the consumer are,
at present, less than the cost increments caused by inflation. But the rate of in-
flation may well change and unanticipated cost reductions may occur. If that
day comes, automatic cost adjustment clauses will assure that it is the
customer, and not the utility investor, who will benefit from the changed cir-
cumstances.
VI. Conclusion
Consumer representatives have roundly criticized automatic cost adjust-
ment clauses.' 61 Such opposition may explain the recent decline in the use of
various modified cost adjustment clauses. 162 Consumer advocates often suggest
that such clauses seem only to raise the customer's utility bills.' 63 To focus on
157 I.R.C. § 167(1) determines eligibility for accelerated depreciation for regulated industries.
158 Treas. Reg. 5 1.167(l)(3) explains the accounting procedures for excluding a deferred tax reserve
from the rate base and, consequently, eliminating the utility's earnings on that portion of the rate base. This
technically qualifies as a reduction in capital cost; it very well might, however, be an appropriate cost to be
reflected in an automatic cost adjustment clause. It does not violate the principle of not reflecting in the
automatic adjustment the capital costs that will be altered because of the adoption of the clause itself. In-
stead, this type of capital cost, an automatic rate-base reduction based on a tax savings, is much more like
the inescapable costs (or in this case, savings) that automatic cost adjustment clauses are designed to reflect.
159 Warren, Tax Accounting in Regulated Industries: Limitations on Rate Base Exclusions, 31 RuTGERs L. REV.
187, 193 (1978).
160 For a full discussion of this tax accounting savings and its possible use in passing through utility cost
savings, see id.
161 For a summary of the criticisms of Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana, the Moss Committee Report, Con-
sumer Reports and such consumer groups as Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Environmental Action Foun-
dation, Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), and East Tennessee Research Corporation, see
Carver, supra note 6, at 663-67; Comment, The Fuel Adjustment Clause and Its Role in the Regulatory Process, 47
Miss. L.J. 302, 302-06 (1976).
162 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
163 Part of the reason for this maybe that bisected billing which separates the "base cost" from the "ad-
justment cost" draws the consumer's attention to rising prices and focuses blame on the adjustment clause.
A single billing system which reflects high capital costs and outdated cost increments in a single number
does not alert the consumer to a specific focus for complaints about utility bills.
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the immediate rise in rates that sometimes accompanies adoption of an adjust-
ment clause is to lose sight of the overall cost of the typical cost adjustment
methods. A utility cannot provide continued service for less than production
costs. Without automatic cost adjustment clauses, the ensuing rate adjustment
will reflect both increased operating costs and increased capital costs. The con-
sumer cannot escape paying the cost of producing the utility service he con-
sumes either directly or indirectly. At best, the consumer can receive the ser-
vice at the least possible cost if production costs or capital costs can be reduced.
By eliminating the inflation/regulation risk, automatic cost adjustment clauses
will not increase consumer costs. They may, in fact, in the long run reduce
them.
Consumer advocates argue that the regulatory lag associated with tradi-
tional cost adjustment methods provides necessary incentive for utility efficien-
cy. As an argument, it is merely an unscrutinized, long-accepted conventional
wisdom. It is based on the fallacious principle that there will be a necessary cor-
relation of possible utility savings with the rate of inflation during the period of
lag. The utility is rewarded whenever costs decline or savings exceed inflation
costs and is punished whenever inflation costs exceed efficiency. The reward to
a utility is not based on the utility's efficiency, but instead will depend primari-
ly on the amount of inflation in inescapable costs. Moreover, by squeezing un-
controllable costs, such as fossil fuel costs, and controllable costs, such as
research and development costs, together, regulatory lag may promote long-
term production inefficiency. Regulatory lag distorts the introduction of cost-
saving efficiencies and may encourage utilities to build an "efficiency reserve"
that will be held against the possibility of future financial disaster caused by
regulatory lag. Regulatory lag functions neither to reward the efficient nor to
punish the inefficient. Consumers should not rely on it as the primary efficien-
cy incentive.
Some benefits can be anticipated from automatic cost adjustment clauses.
By passing through costs as they are incurred, more efficient allocation of
scarce resources is achieved. Eliminating regulatory lag will end the need for
frequent rate hearings, and will, thus, reduce the administrative costs of
regulation. Cost reductions can be passed through to the consumer
automatically. Adoption of cost adjustment plans will encourage commissions
to consider new efficiency programs. Commissions will have to review utility
costs by generic classification. Consumer advocates recognize that "under-
staffed state commissions, flooded with requests for rate increases, can't check
the details of these enormously complex transactions.' 64 Of course, automatic
cost adjustment clauses will not provide increased manpower. But by forcing
commissions to devote rate hearings to fundamental questions of regulation
and to leave administrative implementation to auditors and others trained to
monitor the utilities' implementation of the commissions' plans, it focuses the
commissions' attention where it belongs: on determining rates that will provide
continued, dependable service at the lowest possible cost to the utility
customer. 
65
164 FuelAdjustment Caper, supra note 5, at 837.
165 This is the assumed goal of regulatory commissions. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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